In this paper, we present a system called Checkbochs, a machine simulator that checks rules about its guest operating system and applications at the hardware level. The properties to be checked can be implemented as 'plugins' in the Checkbochs simulator. Some of the properties that were checked using Checkbochs include null-pointer checks, format-string vulnerabilities, user/kernel pointer checks, and race-conditions. On implementing these checks, we were able to uncover previously-unknown bugs in widely used Linux distributions. We also tested our tools on undergraduate coursework, and found numerous bugs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of software in many mission critical applications has led computer scientists to focus on software reliability, more than ever before. Many ways have been proposed to make software more reliable, secure and bug-free. Broadly, these techniques can be grouped into static compile-time techniques and dynamic run-time techniques.
Static compile-time techniques analyze program source code to detect errors. This method, though very effective cannot take advantage of the information available at run-time. Dynamic runtime techniques on the other hand mostly rely on an interpreted environment, or instrumentation at source-code or binary level. For this reason, dynamic runtime techniques have seldom been used to test the correctness of an operating system. Instrumenting the source code or binary of an operating system requires clever engineering effort and deep understanding of the OS internals. Further, binary instrumentation requires thorough understanding of the instruction set architecture. And even when the instrumentation is complete and correct, the execution of instrumented code can change the behavior of the OS indeterministically due to a different interleaving of concurrent threads.
In this paper, we present a dynamic runtime checker called Checkbochs which has been implemented using an existing x86 machine simulator called Bochs [5] . Since each machine instruction in a simulator is interpreted, it allows us to do complex runtime analyses without the pitfalls associated with instrumentation. By tracking data flow at runtime, and checking for some known properties, we found interesting bugs in two widely used Linux distributions. We also implemented a dynamic data race detector inside the simulator to be able to find data races in operating systems. As a case study, we checked an academic operating system called Pintos which was built as part of undergraduate coursework at Stanford. Some of our contributions are:
• Checkbochs allows dynamic runtime analysis by implementing rules to be executed while interpreting instructions in the guest software.
• Checkbochs can identify bugs across all layers of software running on the system. It does not require prior knowledge of the applications or their source code before reporting violations.
• Checkbochs does not change application or OS behavior in any way since all its operations occur at the hardware level. In fact, Checkbochs can be used on an existing disk image.
• Implementing new runtime rules in Checkbochs is easy and straightforward This paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the Checkbochs dataflow analysis framework that can be extended to check various system rules at runtime. Section III describes the implementation of one such rule -the dynamic data race detector. Section IV discusses the related work, and finally Section V concludes.
II. DYNAMIC DATA FLOW ANALYSIS
In our dynamic data flow analyses, we wish to infer types of machine values and then check for violations of typeproperties at runtime. For example, if two file-descriptors are multiplied at any point in the execution of the system, it signals an error.
Checbochs provides a framework, which allows users to specify data types and corresponding system rules to be checked during runtime. In this section, we describe the implementation of this framework and also the results obtained by implementing some rules.
A. Implementation
To track types of machine values, Checkbochs maintains a shadow machine state The shadow state consists of the shadow registers, instructions and shadow physical memory. Since the instructions use virtual memory addresses, we also implemented a virtual-memory translation logic in the shadow space.
Data flow is monitored by associating all data transfer and arithmetic instructions (load, store, move, add, etc.) with their counterparts in shadow space. For example, a move dest, src instruction would also cause the contents of src to be copied to dest in shadow space. Using this data flow framework, we tag data values with their types in shadow space and analyse their flow across the system. Some of the types that we inferred using Checkbochs are tabulated in Table II Sometimes, the flow of type information is not directly associated with the corresponding data flow. For example, consider the sample code of the read() system call in Figure  1 . At the entry of the function, buf is an unchecked user ssize_t sys_read(...,char *buf,...) { char *tmp = buf; if (!access_ok(tmp)) fail(); ... *buf = 42; /* safe? */ } Fig. 1 . The system call parameter buf is an unsafe user pointer. However, since a derived variable tmp has been checked for safety, the assignment to *buf should be considered legal.
pointer. The assignment statement tmp=buf changes the type of tmp to an unsafe user pointer too. Subsequently, tmp goes through the appropriate check and its type is changed to a safe user pointer. However, the result of this check is not reflected on the type of buf and the line *buf=42 will incorrectly flag a warning.
We solved this problem by using an extra level of indirection in the shadow space. Instead of holding the type value, the shadow state holds pointers to type objects. Hence, an assignment statement like tmp=buf causes the pointer to buf's type object to be copied to tmp's shadow state. Since both buf and tmp now point to the same type object, any change in tmp's type is reflected in buf's type and vice versa. This extra level of indirection is also illustrated in Figure 2 Pointers to Type Objects. Both tmp and buf point to the same type object, after assignment of tmp to buf. Hence, any change to the type of tmp will also reflect in the type of buf.
B. Results
We ran two different disk images on Checkbochs: debian-3.0r1 and gentoo-2004.3. Both these disk images were obtained after freshly installing the latest available distribution CDs by these vendors. Using our dataflow framework, we check for flavors of copyin/copyout bugs, improper handling of malloc(), fopen() functions and formatstring vulnerabilities. The results obtained by performing these checks are described in detail in the following sections.
1) CopyIn/CopyOut Bugs:
A user value passed as a system call argument must be checked through one of the copyin/copyout functions before getting dereferenced. Failure to do so, opens a port of attack, whereby an attacker can crash the kernel, or worse be able to write his own data at a specific kernel address. Another variation of this rule is that a user pointer should never be dereferenced in the kernel with disabled interrupts.
Implementing this rule using our data flow framework was straightforward. All system call parameters are tagged as unchecked user values. Any check on the user value through one of the copyin/copyout functions cause the type of the user value to change from unchecked to checked user value. A warning is flagged if an unchecked user value is dereferenced in the kernel or a user value is dereferenced with disabled interrupts.
Using these rules, we identified one copyin/copyout bug in the poll system call of the linux kernel. In this instance, the user pointer was checked for read access, while a write operation was performed on it. This can be a security flaw on many architectures, including Intel 386. The submitted bug was acknowledged by Alan Cox on the Linux Kernel Mailing List [9] .
2) Improper handling of malloc(), fopen() return values:
Any use of glibc functions like malloc() and fopen() must be accompanied by a null check before they are used. To check this rule, we tagged the return values of these functions until they were checked against null. Implementing this rule, we found many instances of violation in the kernel and common applications like ps, grep, fsck, and swapon. The violations in the kernel were found in the IDE device driver of linux-2.4.18. In all, after minimal testing, we found 16 bugs in user-level software and 6 bugs in the kernel. All these bugs were accepted, and subsequently fixed.
3) Formatstring
Vulnerabilities: A formatstring vulnerability [8] is caused due to a design misfeature in the C standard library combined with problematic implementation of variable argument functions. A value from an untrusted source (such as the network) should not be used without proper checks inside the formatstring argument of the printf family of functions. Failure to do so, can lead to a complete compromise of security, when combined with other bugs. To test applications, we mounted an NFS partition on the guest system and ran a number of applications on it. Although, we hoped to obtain some bugs in applications running on data in the untrusted NFS partition, we obtained only one false positive in the sendmail program. In this case, each character of the string received over the network was carefully checked before using it in the formatstring. Since our rule does not implement a way of finding out whether a value has been appropriately checked for safety, it reports a false warning.
In essence, we believe that machine simulation allows us to track data flow across many different applications, which would have been difficult (if not impossible) to do with instrumentation techniques. We are investigating other uses of this dataflow framework in determining interesting system properties. Recently, dynamic dataflow tracing was used to determine lifetime of sensitive data like passwords [6] . The work revealed the startling result that sensitive information could live in the system for a long time in places like system caches and device buffers (places which are not in the control of the application vendor).
III. RACE CONDITIONS
Multi-threaded programming is difficult and error-prone. It is easy to make a mistake that produces a data race, yet it can be extremely hard to locate this mistake during debugging. A very effective dynamic data race detection algorithm is the lockset algorithm, first proposed in a tool called Eraser [16] . Eraser used binary rewriting techniques to monitor every shared memory reference and verify that consistent locking behavior is observed. The lockset algorithm enforces the simple locking discipline that every shared variable is protected by some lock. Since there is no way of knowing which locks are intended to protect which variables, this protection relation can be inferred from the execution history. Figure 4 summarizes the lockset algorithm. More details on the algorithm can be found at [16] .
We implemented the lockset algorithm in Checkbochs. On testing undergraduate coursework [12] , we found numerous bugs in assignments that had received a near-perfect score. We also found one benign race in the base operating system pintos [13] provided to the students.
Let locks held(t) be the set of locks held by thread t For each v, initialize lockset(v) to the set of all locks On each access to v by thread t, set lockset(v) := lockset(v) locks − held(t); if C(v) = {}, then issue a warning. 
IV. RELATED WORK
There has been a growing impetus on software reliability and security in recent years. Researchers have considered many ways to perform post-production checks in software.
Static compile-time analysis with programmer written compiler-extensions was used to catch around 500 bugs in the linux kernel [1] , [2] . Using static data flow analysis and domain specific knowledge, many bugs were found in the heavily audited kernel. Ways have also been suggested to automatically detect anomalies as deviant behavior in the source code [3] . Most of the bugs checked by static analysis are local to a single file, sometimes even local to a single procedure. This is due to the complexity involved in performing global compile time analysis. This limits the power of static analysis tools to surface bugs. Our approach, on the other hand, can track data flow across many different software components possibly written by different vendors and can thus target a different variety of errors. However, static analysis has the huge advantage of being able to check all possible code paths, while our execution-driven approach can only check bugs along the path of execution in the system. Recently, model checking was used to find serious file system errors [4] . Using an abstract model and intelligent reduction of the state space, they could check for errors which would have required an exponential number of search paths through traditional testing. Model checking can check for deeper semantic bugs than possible with static compile-time analysis. We intend to use similar ideas to model check entire system images, thus allowing us to search a larger number of execution paths while performing our shadow machine analysis. One of the obstacles in this direction is the slow speed of machine simulation that makes execution of speculative paths almost infeasible.
Shadow machine simulation has been previously used to perform taint analysis to determine the data lifetime of sensitive data [6] . This work reported a startling observation that sensitive data like passwords and credit card numbers may reside in computer's memory and disk long after the user has logged out. Such leaks occur at caches, I/O buffers, kernel queues, and other places which are not under the control of the application developer. Our work uses a similar taint analysis by marking all bytes received over the network as untrusted and checking if they are used in unwanted ways (eg. formatstring).
Recently, [15] used taint-analysis on untrusted data to check for security violations such as buffer overflows and formatstring attacks in applications. By implementing a valgrind skin, they were able to restrict the overhead of their taint-analysis tool to 10-25x. Considering that the computation power is relatively cheap, they suggest using their tool in production runs of the software. This will detect and prevent any online attacks on the system.
V. CONCLUSION
We present a novel technique to finding bugs and security holes in system software. Our technique can check for bugs across all layers of software, from the OS to the application. Our approach has very low false positive and false negative rates. This technique can be especially very useful in expediting the process of discovering bugs during software testing.
We conjecture that shadow machine simulation, combined with speculative execution (such as model-checking) can yield
